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Insight
Innovation and Metastability: a Systems Model
Nick Winder 1
ABSTRACT. The culture trap is the tendency to put cultural markers and habits above the demands of
reason or compassion. It can reduce receptivity to new ideas and trigger Phoenix Cycles of catastrophe and
renaissance. System research is then complicated by the historiographic problem of continuity and change,
because there are no objective criteria for deciding whether "the system" survived or was destroyed by the
catastrophe. This paper explores the differences between uncertainty emergence and self-organizing
emergence using the concept of a "possibility space" to clarify the relationship between anti-causal events
and causal states, i.e., the meso-history of conjuncture. Conjunctures are interpreted ex post in the context
of deep time. The paper distinguishes autopoiesis, i.e., a new instance of a species, from elaboration, i.e.,
the origin of new species. It also describes a spectrum ranging from metastability, in which the possibility
space is time invariant, to innovation, in which the possibility space is a synergetic artefact of changing
habits and beliefs. Metastable systems are computably complex; we can make predictions across the
boundaries of successive conjunctures, subject to statistical uncertainties. Innovative systems are
uncomputably complex; although we can make predictions within a conjuncture and anticipate bottlenecks,
we cannot predict beyond the conjuncture because conceptual taxonomies will not be conserved. The
relationship between adaptive potential and constraint remains fundamental, although debates about
whether the system is resilient are meaningless. System boundaries are artefacts of a dynamic consensus.
The analytical sciences use methods designed for metastable systems, whereas the discursive sciences
presume innovation. These methods predispose researchers to different space-time perspectives that, in
turn, make it possible to generalize about their roles in different policy arenas. Tensions between analytical
and discursive scientists become more understandable and manageable if these historiographic issues are
clarified. The relationship between innovation and metastability is illustrated in an appendix on the
emergence of social complexity in Europe.
Key Words: adaptive potential; cultural ecodynamics; complex adaptive systems; innovation;
metastability; resilience. 
THE PHOENIX CYCLE
In the history of the Earth, co-evolutionary
catastrophes, in which one population undermines
the fitness of another (Norgaard 2005, Winder et al.
2005), seem to have alternated with periods of
complexification and rapid social change. Some of
these catastrophes were interspecific, such as
epidemic disease, in which parasites change
mortality and survivorship in the host population.
Others were intraspecific, e.g., competition for
limited resources between populations of the same
species. Some were symmetrical: Warfare is a case
in point. Others were asymmetrical, e.g., slavery,
subjugation, and inequitable trade.
The first half of the 20th century brought co-
evolutionary catastrophes on such unprecedented
scales that a new word, “genocide,” was coined to
describe them. Complex system theory, the
intellectual framework of this paper, came into
being at the end of World War I and was
consolidated in the aftermath of World War II. The
roaring 20s and the swinging 60s had many
parallels, including a widespread rejection of
conventional morality, a growing concern about
environmental degradation, rapid technological
change, and an interest in the science of complexity.
The complexity revolutions and genocide of the
20th century are part of the same Phoenix Cycles.
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Bertrand Russell (1961) wrote of a negative
correlation between stability and creativity that
helps to explain these cycles: “A stable social
system is necessary, but every stable social system
hitherto devised has hampered the development of
exceptional artistic or intellectual merit. How much
murder and anarchy are we prepared to endure for
the sake of great achievements such as those of the
Renaissance? In the past, a great deal; in our own
time, much less. No solution of this problem has yet
been found, although increase of social organization
is making it continually more important.”
Russell was already an old man in the 1960s, but
his sentiments captured the spirit of the times. The
chaos of early modern Europe with its dying
theocracies and emerging technocratic systems had
many resonances in the developing world. Remedial
aid, unless it raised the expectations of the poorest
people, simply fueled population growth,
aggravating environmental degradation in the
present and increasing future needs. This
Malthusian ratchet was wholly pernicious
(Bhagwati 1966), but our only strategy for
disengaging it seemed to be to increase the world’s
productivity, driving economic growth and social
stratification.
It was already clear that economic growth could not
be sustained indefinitely, but established technocracies
were locked into social engineering, inequitable
trading patterns, and the Cold War arms race and so
found it hard to change direction. Schumpeter’s
(1939) work on the relationship between research
and innovation was cited to justify a command
economy for research services, but his observation
that an innovation was not the same as an invention
was largely ignored. By the 1970s, many
environmentalists suspected that nothing short of a
global catastrophe, i.e., the Doomsday Scenario,
would weaken social constraints enough to permit
a less technocratic approach.
The slow-motion catastrophe of Cold War policies
polarized trade relations, causing many millions
more to die of avoidable diseases, desertification,
violent oppression, and poverty. Communist
revolutions in the Far East added to the sense of
pessimism, and the responses of the superpowers
hardly inspired confidence. The Doomsday
Scenario would certainly have effected substantial
change, but long-term trends suggested hideous
collateral damage. It was possible that such a
catastrophe would trigger a global extinction
cascade comparable to the one that occurred at the
Cretaceous-Tertiary interface.
Ernst Schumacher (1973) made a substantial
contribution by highlighting problems of
subsidiarity. Like many others of his generation, he
argued that we were consuming the world’s capital
as though it were disposable income. The practice
of economics “as if people mattered” demanded
actions tailored to accidents of history and
geography and the use of appropriate technology.
According to Schumacher (1973:31): “The greatest
danger invariably arises from the ruthless
application, on a vast scale, of partial knowledge.”
He and others writing in a similar vein were
particularly concerned about social engineering and
technocratic extremism. These concerns were
played down by governments and ridiculed by many
scientists, actions that later polarized the post-
modern debate.
Mainstream science departments still provided
niches for holistic thinkers, and the post-war
systems revolution was still committed to
integrating humanistic and scientific perspectives.
Upgrade and downgrade cycles were known to be
common. We find them in botany (Watt 1947), in
the cycling of predators and prey (Volterra 1926),
and in the complex hide-and-seek behavior of
experimental microcosms (Huffaker 1958).
Holling (1973) characterized a general adaptive
cycle and argued that human action to maximize the
sustainable yield of an ecosystem gave it a certain
brittleness or rigidity that made catastrophic
disintegration likely. The concept of system
resilience as a balance between constraint or
connectedness and adaptive potential suggested
links between the Phoenix Cycle of catastrophe and
renaissance, the problems exercising environmentalists
and complex systems research.
Beginning in the 1960s, a number of authors,
notable among them Richard Buckminster-Fuller
and Kenneth Boulding, likened the Earth to a
spaceship whose life-support systems depended on
effective recycling and purification. The possibility
that carbon emissions, refrigerants, and aerosol
propellants would damage the ozone layer began to
engage environmentalists in the 1970s but was
strongly resisted by governments and multinationals.
By the end of that decade, James Lovelock (1979)
had offended many of his peers by suggesting that
global life-support systems were comparable to a
Ecology and Society 12(2): 28
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art28/
biological organism, i.e., a complex adaptive system
able to maintain its internal parameters in the face
of environmental and metabolic fluctuations.
Lovelock’s theory was a natural extension of von
Bertalanffy’s (1968) thesis that ecosystems and
institutions are organisms. In turn, von Bertalanffy
was building on foundations laid by Herbert
Spencer in the 19th century. However, many
scientists were dismayed by the suggestion that the
Gaia system could have properties that were not
deducible from those of its constituent subsystems.
Atheism and reductionism had become cultural
markers in science, and the idea that the whole was
more than the sum of its parts seemed metaphysical.
Public concern about sustainable development
(Brundtland 1987), global warming, the management
of the water cycle, and the disaster at Chernobyl
created a growing awareness of global and
transnational commons through the 1980s. By the
time the Maastricht treaty was signed, subsidiarity
had ceased to be the concern of theologians and
environmentalists and become a high-profile
political issue. Policy makers began to accept that,
although small is often beautiful, large is sometimes
necessary. We cannot mount an effective response
to global warming at the level of the village council.
Each system is bounded to respect different
spatiotemporal scales, and the people managing
them explore different possibility spaces.
Systems practitioners have responded by
developing integrative, multiscalar approaches to
complexity. System theory has become the search
for the analytical scales (Boulding 1956, Gell-Mann
1994), the spatiotemporal scales (Hägerstrand 1987,
Gunderson and Holling 2001), and the cultural
scales (van der Leeuw 1998) on which systems
emerge and tractable problems can be posed.
However, neither system theory nor any other
intellectual agenda has objective criteria for
distinguishing good from bad systemic reorganization.
Few people would grieve if the anopheles mosquito
was annihilated, but the loss of a species of butterfly
causes consternation. Viewed dispassionately, they
are catastrophes of the same logical type, but we do
not view them this way.
Further progress will not be made by annotating
pictures of the Phoenix Cycle, because the cycle
itself challenges the very ontology of the systems
method. Whereas von Bertalanffy felt able to assert
that there were systems everywhere, we now
understand that this is not true. Abstract systems are
at least partly the products of the embodied mind,
instantiated again and again in different problem
domains (Read 2003; see also Poincaré 1952, Lakof
and Núñez 2000). To know whether a system has
persisted or been destroyed, we first need to know
what the system is. That is a taxonomic problem.
Scientists of the later 20th century often avoided
discussing these boundary judgments because they
led to semantic arguments that hampered research.
In the analytical sciences, boundary judgments are
often made expediently for the sake of argument.
We locate the scales on which a robust, quasi-
classical system comes into focus. Once those
judgments are made, fiddling around with boundary
judgments is inimical to analytical method. We
therefore take the boundary of the system as given
and time invariant, even though we know very well
that it is an emergent phenomenon. This creates a
correlation between boundary judgments and
operational judgments, i.e., methods and problem-
solving strategies.
Discursive scientists, on the other hand, understand
that the boundary judgments that define systems and
problem domains coincidentally determine who or
what is a stakeholder and who or what is beyond the
pale (Vickers 1965, Boulding 1978, Churchman
1979). For this reason they may try to negotiate new
system boundaries that maximize social inclusion
(Flood and Jackson 1991, Rosenhead and Mingers
2001). Environmental activists also advocate new
boundary judgments to emancipate nonhuman
species and minorities (Carson 1962, Naess 1989,
Lee 1993). In this they may find themselves opposed
by an alliance of politicians and analytical scientists
whose professional credibility rests on the
proposition that complex socio-natural systems are
safer in their hands.
A NATURAL SUBSIDIARITY
All sciences presuppose a working taxonomy, i.e.,
an ontology of categories and methods used by
practitioners. The analytical sciences need
taxonomies that are robust over very large intervals
of space and time. The ontology of atoms and
chemical bonds, electrons, masses, and positions,
for example, can be applied to physical systems over
huge intervals of space and time. This stability lends
itself to predictive methods. We can predict the
behavior of massive objects or chemical reactions
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and test these predictions experimentally. Although
philosophers argue that goodness of fit proves
nothing (Popper 1959), the dependability of
physical laws is the mainstay of applied science.
The applied analytical sciences need dependability,
and this encourages us to look for systems under
such extreme constraint that their behavior can be
predicted. By applying analytical methods to these
simple systems, we can develop technical
infrastructure that facilitates certain types of
actions, such as the Internet, roads, institutions,
factories, and so on. The products of applied science
usually become manifest as “pockets of local order”
(POLOs) in the landscape (Hägerstrand 1975,
1985). Human behavior is influenced by these
POLOs, which underpin cooperative responses to
threats or opportunities.
This emphasis on collective action and technical
infrastructure creates a natural link between the
analytical sciences and large institutions such as
multinational companies, national and supranational
polities, etc. These are the agencies with the power
to respond or to block responses to the demands of
global and transnational commons like the oceans,
great river catchments, forests, and the atmosphere.
In general, large institutions are slow moving. Their
survival depends on maintaining the status quo.
They are heavily sectorialized and constitutionally
incapable of responding to accidents of local history
and geography.
Discursive scientists, however, understand that it is
not the POLOs that make individual lives
meaningful, but the habits and rituals that help us
maintain contact with valued resources, including
other people. To treat these structured activities as
a goal-directed sequence of processes is like
pretending that lovers eat together because food is
cheaper purchased in bulk and you only need one
kitchen.
Having identified unacknowledged stakeholders in
the present, discursive scientists are more interested
in emancipating them than in manipulating the
landscape to produce new POLOs. This diverts
attention from constraints, infrastructure, and
stability to structured activities and political and
social change. Sociological “laws” are so localized
in space and time that the use of the word is almost
absurd. Those social systems whose behavior is
predictable are usually so severely constrained that
there are many unacknowledged stakeholders to be
found. Consequently, large institutions often find
the very presence of discursive scientists irksome.
Large institutions may use their financial and
political muscle to shift resources from discursive
science, and disruptive local issues, to analytical
science and the status quo. When these “incentives”
are perceived as inequitable, as they have been over
the past two decades, the methods of analytical and
discursive science become cultural markers. The
political power struggle between large and small
institutions may be played out in gladiatorial combat
between analytical and discursive scientists.
Humanists interested in perceptual change are
accused of believing that material objects did not
exist until people knew about them. Engineers, with
a culturally embedded commitment to universal
time and invariant taxonomies, are linked to
political hegemony and accused of answering the
questions they wished someone had asked them.
This is the issue at the heart of the post-modern
debate.
Often the real losers in this power struggle are
stakeholders operating at the regional level. Regions
occupy an intermediate position between the
extremes of universality and particularism. The
success of large-scale policy initiatives is critically
dependent on processes at these intermediate levels
(Folke 2003, Urry 2003). Regional policy makers
work across sectors. They have to deal with national
and supranational institutions and balance their
demands against the conflicts of interest engendered
among local and regional communities.
The most demanding integrative research projects
are invariably mounted at the regional level, where
discursive and analytical scientists come together
to work between scales (Winder 2004, 2005, 2006),
and have to deal with complex linkages among
boundary judgments, value judgments, and
operational judgments that make it impossible to
disentangle culture from nature and science from
politics.
The systems characterized in these integrative
problem domains certainly do not form a
conventional ecological hierarchy (Koestler 1967,
Allen and Starr 1987) or even a panarchy, defined
by Holling (2001:31) as a “representation of a
hierarchy as a nested set of adaptive cycles.”
Integrative systems become manifest on a range of
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scales, not just spatial and temporal but also
analytical and cultural, and do not fit any
overarching hierarchical schema.
Indeed, socio-natural systems can be so poorly
structured that a well-meaning intervention in one
arena can have unforeseen and undesirable spin-off
effects in another. The shift from institutionalized
slavery to international trade, for example, seems
like a resilient transformation viewed from the point
of view of an advanced technocracy, but, for a
starving child in the Third World or another sold
into prostitution to service the tourist trade, the
evidence of progress is less clear.
Supranational agencies and multinationals can
paralyze integrative research simply by raising the
stakes. Despite investment in inclusive governance,
the impact of all this consultation and investment
on policy is often negligible. Regional stakeholders
become disenchanted because there is no route to
emancipation that does not involve a catastrophic
system collapse. Research managers need to be
aware of this ethical dilemma. Without buy-in from
larger institutions, governance and integrative
research teams can actually aggravate social
exclusion by destabilizing the socio-natural systems
that they are created to serve.
STRUCTURE AND CULTURE
In a world in which one species has entrained global
life-support systems, it may be useful to know what
makes individuals of that species happy. Humans,
for example, are obligate social animals, as unable
to thrive alone as ants or bees. Natural selection has
shaped our predisposition to familiar, almost
liturgical activity. We play games, participate in
organized religious or secular rituals, make music,
watch soap operas, or walk in the garden.
Structure is an abstract organizing tendency
instantiated in many activity sets. It is not the
behavior itself, but the patterns, habits, and
mannerisms coded into that behavior that give us a
sense of familiarity. Language, for example, is
highly structured. It constrains vocabulary and
syntax, of course, but that discipline facilitates
communication. It also appeals to an aesthetic sense
that allows us to distinguish insiders from outsiders
in terms of structural nuances.
We can see the precursors of structure in nonhuman
species. The regional dialects of songbirds are a case
in point. Some of the co-evolutionary rapprochements
we find in predator-prey relations may also be the
products of social structure. So-called “prudent”
predators (Slobodkin 1961) that focus on older and
weaker prey are capable of learning and imitating.
Wolves, for example, are very receptive to structural
nuances and assimilate well into human societies.
Dogs were probably our earliest domesticate.
Humans are born unable to communicate, but
expecting to encounter communicators. This hard-
wired expectation that the material world will want
to communicate with us is implicate in symbolic
and representational art, literature, theology, and
science. As children, we are driven to achieve
congruence; as young adults, to experiment; and, as
elders, to simplify and teach. If our beliefs were not
a little conservative later in life, structures would
change so fast that communication would become
impossible. When structures become fixed in this
way, anthropologists often speak of culture.
Culture determines the actions we do not take and
the options we do not consider. It is a tacit behavioral
constraint that enables us to respond unconsciously,
by reflex, to a familiar situation. It coincidentally
makes us unreceptive to alternative ways of thinking
or acting. Culture and the structured behaviors it
fixes may also represent communal identity, as a
badge might mark membership in a fraternity.
People who violate cultural norms often find
themselves coerced, excluded, or even attacked by
their neighbors.
The cultural imperative has made us imitative,
coercive, communicative, mystical, moral creatures.
It has also laid a deadly trap for us. In times of
conflict, structured behaviors become cultural
markers that we use to justify ignoring the demands
of reason or compassion. The problem is not that
the prohibited actions are inherently repugnant, but
that normative violations are disruptive. Cultural
markers determine who has the right to the
protection of the community and who stands beyond
the pale. A violation that would otherwise scarcely
be noticed may now trigger furious reprisals. People
begin to argue about tacit knowledge, semantics,
and morality.
The emancipation of slaves, the abolition of public
executions and of blood sports like bear-baiting and
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cockfighting, legislation to protect natural resources
or health and safety in the work place, and controls
on the advertising and distribution of harmful
recreational drugs like alcohol and tobacco all
hinged on conceptual adjustments that changed our
collective understanding of who or what must be
considered a legitimate stakeholder. Each of these
reforms was opposed on the grounds that the new
ontology flew in the face of common sense, denied
the natural order, and violated cultural markers.
The culture trap is a byproduct of our sociability,
adaptive potential, and need for familiar structured
behavior. It exists because we are what we are. As
Vickers (1972) explains: “A trap is only a trap for
creatures which cannot solve the problems that it
sets. Mantraps are dangerous only in relation to the
limitations on what men can see and value and do.
The nature of the trap is a function of the nature of
the trapped. To describe one is to imply the other.”
The culture trap, once sprung, is a merciless double
bind. We cannot innovate until constraints are
relaxed, but constraints will not be relaxed until an
innovation has occurred. It is not just the poorest
and most vulnerable members of society who close
ranks in times of stress; more prosperous citizens
do too. Receptiveness to new ideas is determined
by how much you value what you stand to lose.
Those whom the status quo has made powerful and
those it has subjugated utterly cannot afford to
innovate.
There are always unacknowledged human or
nonhuman stakeholders in these wickedly complex
problem domains (Rittell and Webber 1973). If the
argument is about the best way to drain a swamp,
none of the protagonists will willingly consult the
frogs. When ontologies are contested, every
intervention actually changes the nature of the
system, and so becomes a one-shot operation with
repercussions across time and space.
In wicked problem domains, we cannot assign “the
system” to a recognizable category without
aggravating social exclusion. There is no stable
conjuncture and no prospect of generalization. The
analytical approach, if we were foolish enough to
try it, would almost certainly have unforeseen
consequences. Simply to have someone taking notes
in the corner could undermine stakeholder
confidence and change the course of history. We
need a discursive effort of mediation and conflict
management (Vickers 1965, Boulding 1978, Flood
and Jackson 1991).
This is why it is possible for a well-fed citizen to
walk past a starving neighbor and see only a
troublesome stranger. Even those who are moved
to pity may be reluctant to deviate from cultural
norms. The principal lesson of 20th-century
genocide has been that, in times of co-evolutionary
stress, the culture trap can be so deep that neither
reason nor compassion can extricate us. Ordinary,
gentle people have done the most horrible things
rather than repudiate cultural markers.
EMERGENCE: A KEY CONCEPT
The word “emergence” stands on two conceptual
props. The first, conventionally associated with the
19th-century philosopher George Henry Lewes, has
to do with unpredictability. An event is emergent if
it is not contingent, i.e., cannot be deduced from
axiomatic first principles. This links it to the anti-
reductionist thesis that the whole is not just a
collection of discrete parts that can be bounded,
studied in isolation, and reassembled (Holland
1998, Morowitz 2002).
The second conceptual prop, arguably the more
intuitive, has to do with unfolding and spontaneous
self-organization, which is sometimes called
autopoiesis. Just as a rabbit emerges from a hole and
a seedling from the ground, so emergent order builds
itself spontaneously. A bristlecone pine tree, the
solar system, and the iridescence at the interface of
a puddle and an oil film are all emergent structures
in this spontaneous, self-organizing sense. The word
“spontaneous” tells us nothing about rates; it merely
implies the absence of an external agency, as
planetary orbits are emergent properties of
interacting masses. The gradual corrosion of a
bridge is spontaneous, for example.
The two types of emergence have different spatial,
organizational, and/or temporal signatures, as
illustrated by the following examples.
Both types of emergence may be manifest at
different hierarchical levels in the same system at
the same time. This is because of a dynamic synergy
between networked subsystems. The behavior of an
isolated atom, for example, is unpredictably
emergent, but the orbit of the moon around the earth
is a self-organizing, emergent property of the earth-
moon system. The conjunctural whole is
constrained by the connections between nearby
atoms that somehow damp individual uncertainties
out. As long as that synergetic conjuncture persists,
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we can predict the behavior of the whole using
Newton’s laws. The behavior of the same atoms
spread out over a huge interval of space, however,
would be unpredictable because breaking those
connections would eliminate synergetic damping.
Hierarchical relationships between unpredictability
and self-organizing emergence have led many
system theorists to speculate that a well-formed
hierarchical structure is a universal or at least
extremely common feature of complex systems. In
this respect, at least, there is a strong resonance
between 20th-century hierarchy theory, taxonomy,
and medieval scholasticism (Koestler 1967, Winder
2004).
Certainly, a similar hierarchical relationship is also
manifest between unpredictability and constraint in
the static hierarchies of biological taxonomy. If we
are told that a plant is a member of the genus
Papaver, we can predict that it will possess all the
essential attributes of this genus of poppies. Viewed
at the generic level, the specific attributes that
distinguish, say, the common poppy (Papaver
rhoeas) from the opium poppy (Papaver
somniferum) will be unpredictably emergent. The
only constraints in taxonomic hierarchies are
logical, i.e., the definitions that bound the genus and
its species. However, the hierarchical relationship
between unpredictability and order is comparable
to that found in synergetic hierarchies.
Finally, as if to refute the thesis that hierarchy is a
universal property of self-organizing systems, we
can sometimes find the two forms of emergence
manifest on the same hierarchical level, but
separated in time. The numbers that would win a
future lottery, for example, are emergent in the first
sense. They are unpredictable. Those numbers
emerge from the machine in the second self-
organizing sense. The future intergrades with the
past, and uncertainty emergence gives way to self-
organizing emergence. Here we are not dealing with
a synergetic constraint on dynamic hierarchies or a
logical constraint on static hierarchies, but with a
temporal constraint on an individual object.
Temporal emergence can be slightly more subtle
than the lottery example suggests. The past can also
have emergent properties that self-organize in a
contemporary landscape. An archaeologist cannot
deduce what an excavation will reveal, for example,
but, as the work proceeds, new structures emerge
that may change his/her knowledge of the past. S/
he can even construct a hypothesis that can be
empirically tested this way, predicting the past and
testing that prediction by performing fieldwork or
desk-based research using archives from earlier case
studies. The time constraints that convert
uncertainty emergence into self-organizing emergence
are not artifacts of an objective, universal time that
transforms whole landscapes. They relate to a
subjective time defined relative to the individual
exploring that landscape.
NARRATIVE IS NOT CAUSE
The introduction of a subjective element obliges us
to consider the relationship between landscape and
time. Two parallel developments are significant.
Time geography is an approach that originated in
Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s (Hägerstrand 1975,
1985). Time perspectivism is a theme of
archaeological research that emerged in the 1980s
and 1990s (van der Leeuw 1989, Winder 1993,
1999, 2007, Murray 1999, Olivier 2001, Bailey
2007). There have, of course, been parallel
developments in other disciplines, but without the
emphasis on landscape that we see in these. See, for
example, Faber and Proops (1993) in economics.
All the information we have about the past and the
future is valorized in a contemporary landscape,
either from direct observation or from memory. The
two props of emergence appear antithetical, not
because they have different relations to universal
space-time, but because we actually organize this
information in different ways to construct different
space-time perspectives. Unpredictability tends to
be a small-scale phenomenon or linked to future
events in personal time. Predictability tends to be a
large-scale phenomenon and an attribute of stable
species, equivalence classes, or populations.
The “possibility space” of all lotteries, for example,
is the collection of all possible lottery outcomes. It
stands in relation to the lottery as a genus does to
an individual species. Although the behavior of this
particular lottery is unconstrained ex ante, we are
confident that it will be an element of that possibility
space. Possibility spaces and constraints are abstract
structures. We infer them using experience, logic,
and intuition, but cannot observe them directly, i.e.,
they do not exist out there in the landscape.
However, for all this, we can develop abstract
reasoning methods that represent these spaces and
logical manipulations of them. The marks on paper
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created when we solve problems analytically and
the patterns on a computer screen that represent the
output of a computer simulation are pockets of local
order (POLOs) in a landscape that we use to valorize
the future or the past.
The fact that we can often build POLOs in which
system behaviors become predictable can play us
false if we shift space-time perspectives without
realizing that we have done so. What we see when
we look backward in time, for example, is not a
space of possibilities, but a space of inferred events.
This ex post perspective leads us to construct a
narrative chain comparable to our own experience
of subjective time. The events we infer from
information in a contemporary landscape organize
themselves into a temporal sequence like falling
dominos. We tend to assume that this sequence is
not abstract and subjective, but concrete and
objective, and start looking for patterns. Those
patterns often suggest some sort of connectedness
in the event space that we naturally generalize to the
future. The following text, a handwriting exercise
from schooldays, illustrates the process:
 For the want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For the want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For the want of a horse the battle was lost,
For the want of the battle the kingdom was
lost,
And all for the want of a horse-shoe nail.
Humans are very clever at spotting patterns in
events. Skilled poker players, for example, tend to
have strong memories and be good at reading body
language. These faculties give them a hint about the
likely constraints acting on fellow players, which
they then use to make strategic guesses about risk
and opportunity. An important part of the trick is to
form an intuitive appreciation of the relationship
between the event space, i.e., the set of inferred past
events, and the possibility space of future events. It
is natural to look for continuity between patterns in
the remembered past and the anticipated future, but
the method is far from dependable. You cannot
predict the loss of a kingdom from the loss of a
horseshoe, even though you may feel with hindsight
that the event was pivotal.
METASTABILITY AND INNOVATION
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968) presented his thesis
that analytical systems method could be generalized
by exploring the concept of equifinality. A self-
organizing structure is constrained to remain in a
bounded possibility space of viable end states. A
poppy seed will either germinate or not. If it does,
it will grow into a poppy, not a linden tree or a frog.
If it grows, it will flower or not, set seed or not. Its
environment will influence its development, of
course, but the possibility space that describes these
systems is bounded and knowable a priori, even
though the precise end state of this particular seed
is uncertain.
In this, von Bertalanffy was connecting the event
space to the possibility space by means of a perfectly
reasonable continuity assumption, imposing a
taxonomy on that event space ex post and assuming
continuity of experience ex ante. The method works
rather well, as one can verify by planting a packet
of poppy seeds.
According to von Bertalanffy, the principle of
equifinality can be generalized to ecological and
social “organisms,” but his thesis raises a
fundamental theoretical question. If the possibility
space explored by a complex adaptive system is
static and classifiable, are we justified in claiming
that the whole is more than the sum of its parts? The
question of hyperdeterminism can be set aside. We
have known for 80 years that we cannot deduce a
poppy from Newton’s laws. However, if we get the
taxonomy right, we have the strong impression that
deducibility is locally possible. You can look at the
seed through a microscope and assign it to the
species Papaver rhoeas. From that diagnosis you
can deduce that the seed, if it germinates, will grow
into a poppy plant. Even though we cannot deduce
that the individual seed will germinate, we can speak
of the probability that a seed, selected at random
from a packet of similar seeds, will germinate. A
packet of poppy seeds, then, suggests a metastable
system, and we can use analytical method to make
statistically robust predictions.
In practice, of course, the destruction of predictive
uncertainty through time sometimes results in an
elaboration of structure. This is what some 19th-
century scientists referred to as “evolution” (Huxley
1870, Spencer 1937) or “descent with modification”
(Darwin 1859). Elaboration is conventional
autopoiesis with an element of surprise. Instead of
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getting a new instance of a familiar species, the
possibility space is augmented in some way as new
species come into being. Modern urban societies are
larger and more highly differentiated and stratified
than hunter-gatherer societies, and this structure has
emerged over time.
For many analytical scientists, elaboration is just an
interesting type of metastability. The possibility
space is fixed and time invariant. Although new
species may emerge, they were always there in the
sense that there were regions of the possibility space,
i.e., attractors or Platonic forms, that corresponded
to those species. The new species emerged when
those attractors were finally colonized. Prigogine
(1978) has championed this formalist model,
speaking of perturbations that drive a system far
from equilibrium and lead to spontaneous
reorganization and elaboration of structure (see also
Haken 1978).
Elaborative metastable systems are thermodynamically
open, i.e., capable of receiving information and
material such as perturbations from outside, but
logically closed. The attractors corresponding to
species and genera are formally real and time
invariant. If the whole is more than the sum of its
parts, it is so trivially because one of the parts,
although always there, has not yet been discovered.
The fact that elaborative systems can sometimes
surprise us is merely a function of our imperfect
understanding. If those Pleistocene hunter-
gatherers had not been working with incomplete
information, they could have foreseen the
possibility of a deeply stratified imperial structure.
We, who have the benefit of a more advanced
science, can see this clearly.
Logical closure is a constraint that ensures that the
system at hand is computably complex. It is broadly
equivalent to the assumption that scientists stand
outside the system they are studying. However,
discursive scientists, those who study socio-natural
systems, are actually part of the systems they study.
Their knowledge influences behavior and behavior,
in turn, modifies the system, which feeds back into
the epistemic domain, changing conceptual
taxonomies. This is not just so of human knowledge.
Any creature capable of developing a conditioned
reflex and learning new responses to a familiar
situation is in this position.
Thus, our ability to anticipate and take preemptive
action can change the course of history in a
completely unpredictable way (Popper 1959). Once
we get past the end of the current conjuncture, the
“system” may no longer exist, because the boundary
judgments that define it and the constraints that
sustain it are by-products of habit and structured
behavior. We cannot anticipate categories of which
we currently have no knowledge (Popper 1982).
This is variously called “uncomputable complexity,”
“logical unconnectedness” (Chaitin 1982, Rosen
2000), or “logical openness.” Ex ante, unpredictable
elaboration of this sort is here called “innovation.”
THREE TIME PERSPECTIVES
Annales historians distinguish three time
perspectives (Braudel 1980; see Liljenström and
Svedin 2005, Chapter 1, for an independent model).
Deep time (the longue durée) is so slow as to be
almost static. Conjunctural time (conjoncture) is the
median time of economic, political, cultural, and
biological processes. This is the scale on which
connectedness creates synergetic constraints that
make prediction possible. Event time (histoire
événementielle) is the time frame of “small history,”
current affairs, and daily life. Viewed against the
backdrop of deep time, conjunctures often appear
as more or less predictable cycles. Examples include
the punctuated equilibria of evolutionary systems
(Gould 1980), the boom/bust cycles of economic
growth, Phoenix Cycles of war and peace, the
cyclical sociologies of Karl Marx and Herbert
Spencer, the Lotka-Volterra cycles of animal
populations, or the nested adaptive cycles of
panarchy theory.
Let us define a causal relationship in terms of a
process that forms a logical connection between the
state of a conjuncture at some time in the past and
its current state. That logical connection can be
deductive or probabilistic. It is therefore reasonable
to say that a storm was caused by an occluded front,
but absurd to suggest that it was caused by a
butterfly. There is no logical connection, not even
on the balance of probabilities, between the event
that was a butterfly flapping its wings and the
weather now.
Beneath the conjunctural level we see the small
history of events. Events are anti-causal objects,
logically unconnected to the past in the arena at
hand, although they may form an interpretable
narrative sequence. However, events are capable of
stimulating an epiphany, i.e., a change of perception
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that actually transforms the system’s causal
structure.
Epiphanies are the little “Aha!” moments when
individuals deviate from routine and habit and the
system reorganizes itself at the conjunctural level.
New behaviors are likely to have unfamiliar
structures that, if not damped out by synergetic
connectedness, may spread contagiously and
modify processes at the conjunctural level. This is
an innovation. Under certain circumstances, chain
reactions of epiphanies can trigger an innovation
cascade that appears in the historical record as a
revolutionary change. Many innovation cascades
follow in the wake of co-evolutionary catastrophes
that eliminate or suspend the synergetic veto.
As we look backwards, we see successive
conjunctures and events set against the backdrop of
deep time. A causal process transforms states to
define the conjunctural scenery against which the
narrative of small history is played out. From time
to time, pivotal events occur that, with the wisdom
of hindsight, seem to have presaged a conjunctural
shift. These epiphanies move the system from one
conjuncture to another.
Causal and anti-causal structures always have
different time-space signatures in the synergetic
hierarchy at hand. Processes are the causal upshot
of synergetic constraints; they limit microlevel
behavior from the top down, making it possible to
predict future states within the conjuncture at hand.
Epiphanies, even those initiated by massive
exogenous or co-evolutionary catastrophes, become
manifest in the system on a microscale and, if they
are not smothered by synergetic constraint,
reorganize system dynamics anti-causally, from the
bottom up.
We are all familiar with the ex ante uncertainty
experienced when looking forward. Although we
can extrapolate the causal simplicity of the
conjuncture and sometimes even predict the
synergetic bottleneck that may precipitate a co-
evolutionary catastrophe, we naturally tend to think
on a human scale. The longue durée is easily
neglected, and we get lost in the small history of
daily business and “What if?” questions.
It is almost impossible to distinguish the anti-causal
event that will change the course of history from
events that will simply divert us for a while and be
forgotten. As time passes, event crowds on anti-
causal event, but we do not actually know how
things will turn out. We realize that an event was
pivotal only from a vantage point in the future. As
Søren Kierkegaard put it: We live our lives forward,
but make sense of them backwards. This imposes a
limit on predictability that not only makes the future
uncertain (Prigogine 1996), but may also make
current ideas about possibility spaces meaningless.
PREDICTION AND JONAH’S LAW
All taxonomies are logically open, although some
are more robust than others. We can predict the
mean summer temperature on the top of Ben Nevis
in the year 2500, for example, because the taxonomy
of mountains and temperatures is ontologically
robust in this arena. The prediction may not be very
useful, of course, but at least it is meaningful.
Predicting the gross domestic product of Scotland
in 2500, however, would imply that the polity and
its economy would still be recognizable 500 years
from now. Such a prediction is not just operationally
useless; it is meaningless.
To make predictions that can be tested empirically,
we have to be confident that our taxonomies will
not change in the arena at hand. In practice, this
often means that the system must be highly
constrained, i.e., it must be either a natural system
that cannot be modified by human agency or an
extremely brittle socio-natural system in which any
attempt to innovate would precipitate a collapse. We
can sometimes make testable predictions with
regard to systems with more adaptive potential, but
only by being secretive. If we share our hypothesis
with people inside the system, they may innovate
preemptively and spoil the experiment.
Such dispassionate experiments are often ethically
indefensible. A model that predicts a catastrophic
cascade of collapsing life-support systems cannot
just be logged in an obscure journal for future
reference. We have to innovate in response to this
perceived threat. If we are successful, we will have
changed the course of history in a way that makes
old boundary judgments obsolete.
Cultural ecodynamics are therefore governed by
Jonah’s law. We can only predict the course of
history in systems whose behavior we cannot
influence. We can only change the course of history
if the system has enough wiggle room to ensure that
our predictions are not only uncertain, but also quite
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possibly meaningless. This is because every
prediction carries a hidden contingency: X will
happen if you don't innovate to stop it from
happening.
Neither the positivist thesis that experimental results
can verify hypotheses nor the rationalist antithesis
that scientific hypotheses can only be falsified have
much bearing in cultural ecodynamics. It is a matter
of personal and political preference whether one
takes a hard line, declaring cultural ecodynamics to
be a nonscience, or whether one shifts the
boundaries of science to accommodate uncomputable
complexity. To exclude it, however, one must also
exclude ecology, evolution, 20th-century mathematics,
economics, and sociology, which would produce
the sort of science curriculum imposed on schools
in Tennessee between the two world wars.
CONCLUSIONS
There were actually two complexity revolutions in
the 20th century. The first revolution began between
the wars, when analytical scientists finally accepted
that hyperdeterminist theories were untenable, that
the whole was more than the sum of its parts, and
that we could not deduce a poppy from Newton’s
laws even in theory. The boundaries of analytical
science gradually widened to accommodate
computable complexity and metastable dynamics.
The success of wartime “Big Science” left systems
researchers sending out conflicting signals during
the Cold War. On the one hand, we had the
politically astute, who argued that space-age science
would soon be so advanced that poverty would
disappear. Most repetitive work and a great deal of
technical problem solving would be delegated to
machines, and we would need a new type of
education to prepare us for this affluent society. On
the other hand, we had practitioners who understood
that problems of social exclusion could not be
solved analytically, although they could sometimes
be tackled discursively.
The generality of chaotic and nonlinear systems
method was still being overstated through the 1980s
and 1990s. For humanists and softer practitioners,
this “physics envy” was almost embarrassing
because it suggested that the systems community
had failed to grasp the distinction between
thermodynamic openness and logical openness.
Although it is possible to build mathematical
models to imitate the unpredictability of socio-
natural systems, these are either pedagogic “toy-
world” models or are used to solve logically closed
problems like routing telephone calls or
characterizing the attractors of chemical systems.
Simulation models have little direct impact on
migration behavior, so the method can sometimes
be generalized to ex ante studies in demography or
population ecology. However, in anthropology and
sociology, dynamic models are usually restricted to
ex post case studies in which logical closure can be
assumed. Generalizing from ex post computable
complexity to ex ante uncomputable domains is
seldom justified, but the political demand for
infrastructural solutions to uncomputably complex
problems would brook no opposition. By the late
1980s, the post-modern standoff had driven a wedge
between the analytical and discursive sciences that
frustrated their integration into the academic
mainstream.
The work continued in applied and policy-relevant
settings. The success of this journal is a measure of
that commitment. By the end of the 20th century,
the boundaries of science had widened again, this
time to accommodate uncomputable complexity
and innovative dynamics. Jonah’s law now
governed our predictions. The cost of this is that
many analytical predictions are now known to be
meaningless, but the potential benefit greatly
outweighs that cost. We know more about socio-
natural systems than ever before. What we have
learned over the past few decades means that,
instead of being satisfied merely to predict, we can
now help break the Phoenix Cycle by facilitating
innovation.
Issues of receptivity are clearly significant. The
material constraints that made urban life
unattractive to hunter-gatherers also prevent
advanced societies from living more simply today.
A tired commuter on the train would not swap places
with a peasant who labored from dawn to dusk for
bread, cheese, and homespun clothes. Few of us
would want our children to work in airless factories
or tolerate the floggings and executions needed to
keep people in order. This option is not part of our
current possibility space. Of course, a co-
evolutionary catastrophe could change all that. As
Holling (2001) wisely explains, the term
“sustainable development” is no oxymoron; it is the
only alternative to the Doomsday Scenario.
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We will see in the Appendix to this paper that the
most primitive urban societies were those that
emancipated one social stratum by enslaving
another. Through successive Phoenix Cycles, some
were able to mitigate these stresses, building
infrastructure to emancipate the core by enslaving
the periphery. As communications technology
improved, core and periphery have become
increasingly remote. Today, Malthusian stress is
virtually unknown within advanced technocracies.
Unacknowledged stakeholders in the Third World
and remote nonhuman species now pay the price of
our prosperity.
It is doubtful that this strategy will still be
sustainable when the older superpowers finally
become integrated with the new superpowers of the
Far East. It might seem natural to call for draconian
legislation to force us all to behave more
responsibly. However, clumsy intervention would
spring the culture trap, aggravating social exclusion
among the most vulnerable and driving the powerful
into their cultural laagers. This would reduce the
amount of adaptive wiggle room and frustrate
innovation.
There is no obvious technological solution to the
problems of globalization. The best we can do is to
extend the conceptual structures of system theory
in ways that help us understand, discuss, and
manage systemic change. Intergenerational equity
is important, of course, but co-evolutionary
catastrophes have deepened alarmingly over the last
three centuries. If we cannot soon locate more
resilient configurations, there may not be many
more generations to share resources with. The
model presented here suggests that it may not be
necessary for wealth to be spread evenly across the
planet or between species and generations.
However, a fairer distribution of adaptive potential
is imperative.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art28/responses/
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APPENDIX 1. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:
SOCIAL COMPLEXIFICATION IN EUROPE
Morowitz (2002) uses the origin of agriculture as an example of emergence. He argues that, if one
considers the possibility space of human-environment interaction, agriculture is clearly an attractor, i.e.,
a conjuncture or genus of conjunctures, that has been colonized several times. If the tape were played
again, the result would probably be agriculture.
It is perhaps pedantic to observe that the domestication of animals and plants occurred much more often
than he suggests. The instances that have come to popular attention did so because domesticates were
moved beyond their endemic range by people who left qualitatively new types of trace in the landscape.
It is probable that animals were domesticated in the Pleistocene, for example. Plants and animals have
certainly been husbanded far beyond the cradles of civilization, but there was no explosive
complexification to draw attention.
More than 99% of human history has been nonurban, with very little technological specialization, no
spectacular pockets of local order (POLOs) such as great buildings, and no evidence of conspicuous
wealth, writing, or social stratification. Village-based agricultural societies and hunter-gatherers have
different types of technology, but there is little to distinguish them in terms of social complexity.
Villages are a little larger and more visible than hunting camps, but pastoralists often leave almost no
trace in the landscape. Compared to the Upper Paleolithic art sites of southern France, the subsistence
agriculture of prehistoric Europe and sub-Saharan Africa seems bland and unstructured. The really
interesting topic, as Morowitz’ book amply demonstrates, is not agriculture, but the complexification
with which it is sometimes associated.
Sir Herbert Spencer believed that primitive humans were solitary, asocial beasts. Competition for
limited resources brought Malthusian stress that created a natural selection pressure. This selection
forced us to compete with each other, leading to conflict and war. More civilized populations that could
aggregate in ever larger, more co-operative units were better able to win wars. According to Spencer
(1985), “...this formation of larger societies by the union of smaller ones in war, and this destruction or
absorption of smaller ununited societies by the united, larger ones, is an inevitable process through
which the varieties of men most adapted for social life supplant the less adapted varieties.”
One of the most striking features of Spencer’s model is that the synergetic constraints restricting
adaptive potential are inexorable and universal. Evolution becomes a deterministic process that drives
“progress,” turning apes into savages and savages into gentlemen. This progressive model remains an
important structuring principle in contemporary society, especially in advanced technocracies.
Whenever a science fiction story portrays a being that spontaneously “evolves” into a higher life-form,
we see Spencer’s cultural legacy.
Discursive scientists are reluctant to give Spencer’s theory serious attention because it came to be
associated with the laissez-faire economics of the empires of the late 19th century and the genocidal
policies of the Third Reich. In this respect, physics is a more generous science than sociology. Physicists
do not repudiate Einstein because he was wrong about physical determinism or because his work made it
possible to develop atomic weapons. They retain those elements of his work that remain useful and add
new ones of their own.
Spencer’s hypothesis was not ridiculous. He could have known very little about the biology of great
apes. Malthusian stress was then a universal feature of urban life and, indeed, of life in the rural
hinterland that supplied urban markets. The best reason for rejecting Spencer’s model is that it cannot be
reconciled to evidence gathered after Spencer’s death. Ethnographic research suggests that hunter-
gatherers are much more predisposed to share goods and resources than urbanites are. Population
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pressure can be reduced by sanctioning alternative routes to sexual fulfillment and by practicing
celibacy, infanticide, and other birth control methods.
There are very good material reasons why hunter-gatherers should avoid urban life. Sahlins (1972)
described hunter-gatherers as the “original affluent society” because they were able to produce most of
their subsistence needs in about 4 hr a day. Producing enough to meet domestic needs using agriculture
increases that workload, but the burden of supporting a primitive urban society is almost unbearable.
Intensive mixed agriculture triples that workload, creates malnutrition, and aggravates infant and
obstetric mortality rates. The urban revolutions also brought slavery and engaged the Malthusian ratchet.
These were not developments that seemed like a good idea at the time. It probably took a major co-
evolutionary catastrophe to drive humans out of stable, extensive conjunctures into an urban
configuration (Binford 1983, Chapter 8).
The simplest way to salvage Spencer’s theory is to allow that it is not universally but only locally true.
We divide the possibility space into two attractors. One is demographically extensive, with no or only
weak Malthusian stress; the other is demographically intensive with severe Malthusian stress. The
analogy with physics is rather clear: The extensive attractor is like a cloud of unconnected atoms
floating in the void, whereas the intensive attractor is like a highly connected mass whose behavior is
made predictable by synergetic constraints.
This small adjustment gives us a model in which socio-natural dynamics are metastable. We invoke a
pivotal event or perturbation that flips the system from a demographically extensive attractor to a
demographically intensive one. People must have been driven into these aggregations by the need for
patchily distributed resources in times of environmental stress. In some regions it may have been stands
of wild cereals; in others it could have been water for irrigation.
Once the transition was made, Spencer’s model would apply without loss of generality, although his
belief that sociability was the product of the Malthusian ratchet can no longer be sustained. Humans, like
all the other great ape species, are innately sociable. Where hunter-gatherers tend to share subsistence
resources and villages compete with other villages, we would now see people competing with their
immediate neighbors. Rapid reproduction rates and co-evolutionary stress would put ruthless
delinquents at a small selective advantage. Spencer's argument is turned on its head; cities actually made
people less sociable.
Population growth would have made the process irreversible. The people living around the conurbation
would have had strong incentives to discourage an influx of hungry refugees from the city. Trade
between the centre and periphery would be favored. But what do you trade for subsistence goods when
you live in a city made of mud bricks and stones? The answer seems to be that the city forms an army to
protect the fields and raises taxes to pay for it. It builds infrastructure, such as irrigation systems and
roads, to raise productivity. It trains people to bake clay and make pretty pots and to melt stone and
make pretty metals, and then persuades its neighbors that these goods and services are intrinsically
desirable. The amazing human capacity to negotiate nonadaptive cultural norms comes into its own, as
they persuade each other that this is “normal.” These geegaws become so valuable that farming
communities give their food away to possess them.
Competition within the cities would have driven social stratification. Systems of laws would be
developed to keep the peace. Slavery and capital punishment would become normal. As the population
grew, the size of the exploited hinterland would grow too. Small trading posts would be established on
the periphery to channel food to the centre and craft goods to the hinterland. The urban elites would
need to control subsistence resources, and this would require a system of accounting and a way of
managing the production of the high-status goods that brought those resources in. Markets would be
established and craft specialists recruited to meet this demand. The cities would fill up with craftsmen
working for the elites who would feed them with some of the food they brought in. The civilization
would begin to expand, driven by the Malthusian ratchet.
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Making Spencer’s model metastable is an undoubted improvement. We no longer have to look for the
cause of complexification. All that is required is a co-evolutionary perturbation that drives people into a
conurbation and holds them there long enough for the ratchet to engage. There were probably different
perturbations in different arenas. Some of these complex societies simply collapsed, and the survivors
went back to subsistence agriculture or, in some cases, to hunting and gathering. Others had access to
the right combination of resources and became self-sustaining.
However, there are problems with the metastable model too. Basically, it gives us only two routes to
complexification: spontaneous aggregation or trade and acculturation. In a world without good
communications, this would suggest a contagious model. There is ample evidence of contagious
development, but the diffusion process was remarkably slow. Urbanization crawled out of the Middle
East and crept across Europe like a slow cancer. It reached southeastern Europe in the Bronze Age
(about 5000 years ago) and the northwest Atlantic fringe in the Iron Age (about 2000 years ago), but it
only engulfed Scandinavia in the 17th century. For metastability to be a complete model, there should be
very little complexification beyond the reach of these burgeoning civilizations.
In fact, agriculture spread far beyond the cradle of civilization and may indeed have been discovered
independently in many regions. However, extreme Malthusian stress and runaway complexification did
not spread with it. The first Middle Eastern civilizations had bronze-working and advanced pottery
technology, so European archaeologists tended to see the pyrotechnologies as the fingerprint of
urbanization. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, they discovered that pyrotechnology, like agriculture,
spread much faster than urbanization.
The Bronze Age settlements of Crete do indeed look a little like urban units, but those of nearby
Mycenae look more like fortified villages with warrior elites. No doubt there were famines and infant
and obstetric mortality, but nothing like those experienced by Middle Eastern cities, where density-
dependent diseases would have claimed many. It is conceivable that Mycenae was a second-order
contagious development from the Middle East, but what about the Bronze Age societies on the Atlantic
Fringe?
The later Neolithic and Bronze Age communities of these regions produced some beautiful artifacts and
impressive POLOs, including rich burials, stone circles, and megalithic structures, that naturally make
people think of social complexification. However, there is no evidence here of demographic runaway or,
indeed, of any sort of physical crowding. This is not a spontaneous aggregation event. Neither is there
much likelihood of contagious development through contact with the Middle East because these sites are
rather early, possibly even older than the Mycenaean (Renfrew 1979).
There was little transport infrastructure to facilitate contact between Britain and the Mediterranean
before the second century BC. Exchanges of material goods would have been possible over such
distances, but could hardly have been intensive enough to aggravate Malthusian stress on the western
fringe. We have no reason to believe that the Bronze Age communities around Stonehenge would ever
have developed into an urban civilization spontaneously. This is a different type of complexification,
one in which most competition is directed between neighboring communities rather than between
neighbors in the same settlement.
Metastable models based on the Spencerian mechanism do not explain complexification of this sort or,
indeed, the incipient complexification of the European Palaeolithic. However, they capture the core
dynamics of urban systems quite well, at least until the 20th century, when we start seeing cities with
virtually no Malthusian stress. We therefore need to generalize them in a way that accommodates the
dynamics of less severely constrained systems. Building innovation into the model does this nicely. We
admit the possibility that the level of synergetic constraint can vary. System behavior is predictable and
organized within conjunctures, and more chaotic and unpredictable when constraints are relaxed and
adaptive potential is released.
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The intensity of those synergetic constraints is often linked to demographic and other co-evolutionary
pressures. If food is scarce or the demand for resources high, societies end up playing a “zero-sum
game” in which each person’s gain is another’s loss. Structured behaviors become cultural markers and
constraints harden, initiating a Phoenix Cycle of entrenchment and collapse. After collapse, adaptive
potential is freed up, and people can develop mitigating strategies that reduce conflict, conserve those
aspects of old life ways they value, and abandon those they do not. The interaction of memory with
anticipation and aspiration gives historical systems their ex post path dependence, which makes
narrative possible, but also provides enough adaptive wiggle room to make them unpredictable ex ante.
The history that actually happened represents only one of many possible pathways, and any model that
“predicts” that trajectory to the exclusion of others can usually be dismissed on a priori theoretical
grounds. Historical systems are potentially innovative, and their behavior is uncomputably complex.
They only become metastable, i.e.,computably complex, when synergetic constraints are unremitting
and adaptive potential is curtailed.
